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22 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare Staff.

SUBJECT: Conversation between Mr. C. D. Jackson and Messrs Julian Amery(*), Adam Watson and Tufton Beamish; Albania and other matters.

1. The following is the gist of an oral report made to me by Mr. C. D. Jackson covering certain portions of a lengthy conversation which he had with Messrs. Julian Amery, Adam Watson and Tufton Beamish on 15 October. Messrs. Amery and Beamish are, I believe, Members of Parliament, Beamish having a seat on the Parliamentary Committee similar to our Foreign Relations Committee. The conversation covered a considerable range of subjects, including the US position concerning EDC, our current policy views toward the Eastern European satellites, and the amount of anti-American feeling and talk prevalent in England today -- but the most important portion of the conversation for our purposes dealt with the subject of Albania.

2. In the first place, it is significant that the initial impetus for the discussion of the Albanian situation came from the British side. Mr. Watson, as indicated above, requested the meeting, and the subject of Albania was one of the four points on the agenda which was announced by Mr. Watson to Mr. Jackson. Mr. Amery began by saying that in his opinion something could and should be done concerning Albania, i. e., that it was both desirable and feasible

(*) Mr. Julian Amery will be recalled as the British SOE officer who operated with resistance forces in Albania and adjoining areas during the last war, and who is the author of several books and other writings well known to us, on the subject of resistance. It has not been entirely clear to us just what the extent of his present connections are with the British secret services (MI-5, MI-6, etc.) -- or for that matter with the British Foreign Office. He has kept abreast of Balkan affairs since the war and we have noted his presence and activities in and around Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, etc., within recent years. I believe that our records in the BOPIEND operation will show that we were somewhat concerned about his independent activities at one time, and that we may have challenged the British services in this regard. I recall having asked about Amery in London about 2 years ago and having been told that he was not officially connected, but that he was, of course, well and favorably known to them, very much as we know and keep in touch with certain of our old friends from OSS days.

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to go to work on the Albanian Communist regime. Mr. Amery further stated that the Americans and British should be working together on this matter and he desired to know Mr. Jackson's views. Mr. Jackson replied giving a brief outline of the policy considerations with which we are familiar, and then stating that in his own personal opinion it should be possible to pull Albania out of the Communist orbit without undue risk of provoking a general conflagration. This also seemed to be the view of Mr. Amery. Mr. Jackson went on to say that he thought it desirable for the Americans and British, working together, to devise and install a "button" which would be all ready to "push" at just the right moment. Mr. Amery agreed and pointed out that if such a mechanism were planned and put in place it would be available for use upon very short notice and we would materially reduce and hopefully avoid entirely the possibilities of lengthy delays -- perhaps going over for a whole year in view of weather conditions, etc., -- if and when the "powers that be" should decide that the time was ripe to touch off the operation.

3. At the conclusion of this discussion on Albania, Mr. Amery undertook to present these thoughts and points of view to the appropriate British authorities upon his return to London. At this point Mr. Watson advanced the counter-proposal that he should send these proposals back through his own channels of communication to the Foreign Office. Neither Mr. Amery nor Mr. Jackson had objected to this proposal of Mr. Watson's -- but Mr. Jackson speculated in making his report to me, that Amery would probably have something to say on his own account in London over and above what Mr. Watson may report or propose.

4. Mr. Jackson concluded his report to me with a prediction that the Director will probably be hearing something from "C" within thirty days, and he suggested that we get our ideas lined up in anticipation of this happening. Mr. Jackson is, of course, aware of the numerous discussions of Albania which have taken place in PSB-OCB, and of the temporary decision to put the Albania item on ice (although near the front of the cooler). Mr. Jackson is likewise aware of the tentative proposal that the operation might be a joint US/UK operation with a Britisher as the Chief of the task force, and he commented upon this, saying that he thought it would be an excellent idea and that the British would probably be very gratified by such a proposal. He was inclined to think that Mr. Amery himself might be designated and I told him that this would depend to a considerable extent upon the views of the British

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SIS. I said that we would not be averse to Amery on the basis of what we know about him, but that we had another candidate whom we tended to prefer slightly. I further stated that we would not be very happy about the selection of Fitzroy Maclean, since we were inclined to doubt, on the basis of our war-time experience with him in Yugoslavia, that he would treat us as a full-fledged and equal partner. Deakins?

5. NOTE: I am puzzled as to why Mr. Watson has injected himself so deeply into this particular matter, as I should think that he would recognize this as falling more within the province of [] []. It may well prove to be the case that Mr. Watson has cut [] [] in on all of this. Moreover, it is quite understandable that in view of Mr. Watson's acquaintanceship with Mr. Jackson, he should have been singled out as the British Embassy representative best suited to lay on the meeting. I think it would be desirable for [] [] or [] [] to discuss this matter further with Mr. Watson and/or [] [], in order to ascertain Mr. Watson's "take" on the conversation and to learn just what he proposes to communicate to London as the result of the conversation.

SIGNED

FRANK G. WISNER

Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: DCI
C/SE ~~WISNER~~
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